U.S. Already a Serial Defaulter: Beyond Debt-Ceiling Crises

The stability of U.S. Treasury bills is often taken for granted, but is this trust entirely justified? While debt-ceiling crises grab headlines, a closer look at history reveals instances where the U.S. has arguably defaulted on its obligations. These events, though sometimes obscured or downplayed, carry significant implications for investor confidence and the nation’s financial standing. This article delves into these past episodes, examining the circumstances and consequences that paint a more nuanced picture of U.S. debt management.

From forgotten lawsuits to monetary policy shifts, we’ll explore how these ‘mini-defaults’ have impacted borrowing costs and the perception of the U.S. as a safe haven. By understanding these historical precedents, we can better assess the risks and challenges posed by current and future debt-related debates.

Default Defined

Before examining specific cases, it’s crucial to define what constitutes a ‘default.’ Merriam-Webster defines it as failing to fulfill a contract, agreement, or duty, especially a financial obligation. In the context of government debt, a default typically involves missing scheduled interest or principal payments on bonds. However, the line isn’t always clear-cut.

The determination of a default can be subjective, influenced by judgments and interpretations. Even complex financial instruments like credit default swaps (CDS) rely on committees to decide when a ‘credit event’ has occurred. The inherent incompleteness of contracts leaves room for debate, making the history of U.S. defaults a matter of ongoing discussion.

The War of 1812

The War of 1812 presented significant financial challenges for the young United States. With a fragmented banking system and limited revenue sources, the government struggled to finance the war effort. By mid-1813, borrowing became exceedingly difficult, and by 1814, the situation had deteriorated further. Banks outside of New England suspended payments in gold or silver, and the Treasury Department faced severe difficulties.

Treasury Secretary Alexander Dallas acknowledged the ’embarrassment’ the Treasury was suffering, noting that interest payments on the funded debt were not being made punctually, and a large amount of treasury notes had been dishonored. This suspension of payments, particularly the failure to pay Boston investors interest on federal debt in gold or silver, constitutes a clear instance of default.

Roosevelt Goes Off the Gold Standard

The U.S. had a long history with the gold standard, where currency could be redeemed for gold. However, the Great Depression brought immense pressure on the banking system, leading to widespread bank failures. To address the crisis, President Franklin D. Roosevelt took decisive action, including suspending gold bullion trading and decoupling the dollar from gold.

Congress passed laws that reduced the gold content of the dollar and rescinded gold clauses in both private and public contracts. This cancellation of gold clauses triggered lawsuits, with investors like John Perry arguing that they were owed the original amount of gold stipulated in their Liberty bonds. While the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s power to regulate the value of money, dissenting justices criticized the move as a scheme to repudiate national debts.

The 1979 Mini-Default

In late April and early May 1979, the Treasury experienced payment delays due to back-office problems and a word processing system failure. Approximately 4,000 Treasury checks for interest and principal payments, totaling $122 million, were not sent on time. This delay resulted in an estimated $125,000 in foregone interest.

Claire Barton, represented by her husband, filed a class-action suit against the government, alleging ‘unjust enrichment’ at the expense of debtholders. While a settlement was eventually reached and the suit dismissed, the incident had lasting consequences. A study by Zivney and Marcus concluded that the default warned investors that Treasury issues were not completely riskless, leading to a rise in Treasury yields and increased borrowing costs.

Why This Matters

Each debt-ceiling crisis causes market jitters. The rise in one-month Treasury-bill yields in mid-2023 illustrates this nervousness. When securities thought of as risk-free are questioned, it costs the government more to borrow. Higher Treasury yields, acting as a benchmark, can increase borrowing costs for corporations and individuals, potentially triggering a recession.

Beyond immediate financial impacts, there’s a long-term reputational cost. Central banks may reconsider their dollar reserves, and the loss of the U.S.’s safe-haven status could negatively impact borrowing costs for generations. The experiences of Treasury security holders in 1812, 1934, and 1979 serve as reminders that Treasury securities are not entirely without risk.

The history of U.S. debt reveals instances where the nation has arguably fallen short of its obligations. While these episodes may be overshadowed by debt-ceiling debates, they highlight the importance of responsible fiscal management and the potential consequences of even minor defaults. Maintaining investor confidence is crucial for ensuring stable borrowing costs and preserving the U.S.’s reputation as a safe haven for investment.

By acknowledging and learning from these past experiences, policymakers can work to avoid future defaults and maintain the integrity of the U.S. financial system, securing long-term economic stability for generations to come.

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